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A (Cautionary) Tale Of Two Landing Accidents


FastEddieB

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I think he meant...

 

1) Had he been on a steeper approach (as I am partial to), he would have had more altitude to react to things when the gust/downdraft hit.

 

2) We are told to increase our approach speed when we expect gusts (1/2 of the gust component, IIRC), and he felt he may not have increased it enough for the unexpected gust.

 

Mountain Air is tricky in a Cirrus or otherwise, mainly because it's on a mountain and subject to gusts.

 

John made a small error and paid for it - let's all learn from that and let none of us think we're immune from that sort of thing.

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Your 'I think he meant' explanation seems to say he was too low to react to a gust / down draft.

 

His actual words imply that he failed to advance the throttle even though he recognized that it was an issue.

 

Essentially he decided to hope that he made the runway with adequate energy even though he recognized that energy was in short supply. "As I came over the threshold, the aircraft was pushed down and I did not adjust. I felt I was going to still be ok and land right on the numbers."

 

Instead of crossing his fingers he should have advanced the throttle until the runway and the landing were assured. It is very hard for me to blame the flat approach when he admits he didn't react. Its just as hard to blame a lack of extra margin to allow for gusts when apparently he was slow to begin with. The fact that Mountain Air is tricky due to gusts is all the more reason to fault the failure to react, this reaction is the biggest part of landing on tricky, gusty mountain strips.

 

The CTs lower kinetic energy make it even more susceptible, I have many times had to use WOT at landings, even at touch down.

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One other thing struck me, the pilot admitted it was a downwind landing. Downwind landings are 'fast and flat' and require a higher skill level. A tricky mountain strip, a Cirrus and a downwind landing means that his gust at the threshold was likely from behind his wing. The 1/2 the gust factor above safe approach speed means more on downwind landings.

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  • 3 weeks later...

A wind gust while landing upwind just screws up your touchdown but can be dealt with if you have enough airspeed. A wind gust flying downwind could take 20 kts of airspeed away instantly. Oops. No amount of engine power can save you then.

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  • 3 months later...

Another accident that I would at least partially attribute to excess speed on touchdown (just released, bolded mine for relevancy):

 

 

NTSB Identification: CEN13FA558

14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation

Accident occurred Wednesday, September 25, 2013 in Bolingbrook, IL

Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR20, registration: N406DC

Injuries: 2 Fatal,1 Serious.

 

 

 

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

 

 

On September 25, 2013, about 1715 central daylight time, a Cirrus SR20 airplane, N406DC, impacted terrain after executing a go-around near Bolingbrook’s Clow International Airport, (1C5), Bolingbrook, Illinois. The pilot and one passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was destroyed. The airplane was registered to GDK International LLC and operated by a private individual under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated without a flight plan. The flight originated from Georgetown Scott County Airport (27K), Georgetown, Kentucky about 1500 and was destined for 1C5. 

 

The airplane was captured on 1C5 airport surveillance cameras while attempting to land. A review of the video showed that the airplane touched down multiple times about half way down the runway.  The airplane was observed making a left turn after takeoff, descending, and then proceeding out of camera view.

 

Witnesses reported seeing the airplane depart the runway and make a left turn at a low altitude. The airplane continued to descend, struck a tree and a light pole before impacting a parking lot and sidewalk. A post impact fire ensued and consumed most of the airplane. 

 

The automated weather reporting station at Lewis University Airport which was 5 miles south of the accident site reported at 1715: wind from 070 degrees at 8 knots, 10 miles visibility, clear sky, temperature 21 degrees Celsius ©, dew point 9 degrees C, and a barometric pressure 29.94 inches of mercury. 

 

During the on-scene examination investigators confirmed flight control continuity and that the flaps were in the retracted position. The Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) rocket and parachute were found in the main wreckage. The position of the CAPS activation handle could not be verified due to thermal damage. The parachute was found in a packed state and received thermal damage. The CAPS activation cable was examined and no stretching was found. 

 

The airframe and engine were retained for further examination. 

 

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Hmm...the immediate left turn is odd, unless there is something unusual about that airport I'm missing. Why not just continue straight out, especially if speed is low? Maybe he had his trim set incorrectly for the go around, or did not use proper right rudder for the steep high power climb? Something seems not right about this.

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Hmm...the immediate left turn is odd...or did not use proper right rudder for the steep high power climb?

 

The second part is why it's not odd at all.

 

Most "smoking holes" end up being to the left of runways for this very reason.

 

Think about your "iffy" landing and your excursion to the left. In spite of your best efforts you nearly ran off the runway - fortunately you did use enough right rudder once in the air and saved the day.

 

But lowering the nose and applying enough right rudder to stop the left turn is not an obvious reflex with the ground so close. One must do so even if ground contact is unavoidable.

 

Elsewhere I posted an anecdote about an experience I had with a Cirrus student at Copperhill. To avoid repitition I'll see if I can find it a post a link.

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Here it is from earlier in this thread:

 

 

I've seen that exact scenario play out. I was trying to get a Cirrus pilot to hold the plane off longer so as to land more slowly. I think he was fixated too far down the runway, but regardless he climbed at least 6-10 feet and I called for a go-around.

 

He applied full power and the nose began yawing to the left, away from the runway and towards trees to the left of RWY 2 at Copperhill, TN.

 

My intervention was to aggressively lower the nose and slam in the required right rudder, ground be damned. Though we lost altitude as I applied some pretty extreme corrections, we did not contact the ground. Whew!

 

That's what was needed to to avoid this outcome, IMHO.

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That's pretty much it.

 

The torque roll to the left may have the plane continue rolling into the ground without ever actually stalling or spinning.

 

The fact that there was one survivor may point to that - a fully developed spin rarely allows survival.

 

In any case, there have been probably about a half-dozen Cirrus accidents that play out roughly like this one - bounced landing or porpoising leading to a go-around, and the go-around yaws/turns/rolls left impacting the ground. More common on the 310hp SR22, but as here even 200hp can do you in - and though we have less power, our power-to-weight ratio is not radically different.

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Couple of questions have to be asked.

 

What was his experience in this particular aircraft?

What was the length of runway he typically flew out of and into?

How were his short field skills?

 

Why in the world would he continue an approach when he was quite obviously high and fast? This will never be answered unfortunately.

 

I remember taking a flight not to long ago and jawing with my passenger on final (I know, I know sterile cockpit)when I soon realized there was no way down safely. So I went around. I remember my primary instructor driving the point that unless the approach is stable, (we can have a 10 page debate on stable)on final, go around. I can't remember how many times I went around as a student and still do today. Going around 4 times this past April, saved the behind when my CT got so loaded with ice she started to stall at 80knots.

 

 

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Cirrus planes seem to burn a lot after crashes, there has been a lot of criticism of their wet wing tanks...

 

I'm actually surprised there was a survivor in this case, since there was a post-crash fire.

 

You can never have enough fuel until you are on fire!

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Couple of questions have to be asked.

 

What was his experience in this particular aircraft?

What was the length of runway he typically flew out of and into?

How were his short field skills?

 

Why in the world would he continue an approach when he was quite obviously high and fast? This will never be answered unfortunately.

 

Don't know as to the first three.

 

As to the fourth, I think it's a combination of task fixation and plain optimism. He had probably done the same thing, more or less, multiple times in the past and gotten away with it.

 

Best to realize we're all susceptible to the same human traits, but we need to try through training and discipline to minimize their effects.

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Such a shame. You are right Eddie, nothing takes the place of good training and discipline.

 

 

@CT,

I got into rain that changed to sleet. Poor decision on my part to continue as I was pretty close to becoming a statistic. I would post the video of what I landed in if I could figure out how.

 

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It was an amazing experience. One of those never again moments. The 3 things that I thought about as I went around each time, watching the angle of bank and airspeed , "how many tines are you gonna go around before you pull the chute" and thank goodness my daughter flew commercial.

 

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It was an amazing experience. One of those never again moments. The 3 things that I thought about as I went around each time, watching the angle of bank and airspeed , "how many tines are you gonna go around before you pull the chute" and thank goodness my daughter flew commercial.

 

On the one hand, "All's well that ends well".

 

But have you ever reflected back to consider the better choice might have been to pull?

 

Better because your odds for survival would have been markedly higher?

 

If so, have you reflected on what psychological or other pressures may have kept you trying a very dangerous maneuver repeatedly rather than pulling?

 

In the Cirrus world, there are a large number of fatals that likely would not have been had the pilot pulled. Training is trying to focus on "Consider CAPS", so the chute is more seriously reflected upon sooner rather than later - which can and did end up being too late or never in a depressing number of cases.

 

Not finding fault, just trying to provide food for thought.

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