Lancair ES-P Build

[gbigs]

We bought the FD CTLSi completely blind before taking a single flying lesson.  The strategy was to save on rental and be able to go up when we wanted and have a training plane at the end that would preserve it's resale value.  As we anticipated from the beginning we have outgrown the mission and capability of the CTLSi.  We only became pilots to fly cross-country, not do breakfast runs forever.

 

Our research and decision to go with a Lancair ES-P is complex, as anyone pondering a new high cost and high performance aircraft knows.  We are outfighting the plane with a parachute (few even understand the importance of that).  We did not go with retractable gear, multi-engine, or a plane with a poor safety history.  And along with the higher performance; wanted cabin pressurization and the ability to fly above the weather; both capabilities few other four-seaters have...

 

One could make the case that flying low and slow in a non-controlled busy airport environment is more dangerous than where we are going next.. I will make no comment on the pilot experience/age issue.  People vary in regard to capability and the genes that kill one person at 50 and let's others go till 100.

[Ed Cesnalis]

I see merit in both arguments.  Single engine, fixed gear and lower performance wing are important considerations.  The way an individual ages is another good argument.

 

I remember long ago flying with a friend who was a new pilot who did all of his training in his Beechcraft Baron.

 

Then again the Flight Design dealer that sold me my CT and worked on many of the CTs in this country killed himself and 4 friends in his Baron after a lifetime in aviation where he worked his way up.

[FastEddieB]

Of course.

 

I think Lufthansa still does their training ab initio in Bonanzas. We met a fellow who had just soloed in one at one of our fuel stops on the way back from Page.

 

With the right instructor, the right program, the right student and, perhaps most importantly, the right attitude, it certainly can be done.

 

I look forward to progress reports on both the build and the training.

[Top Cat]

We bought the FD CTLSi completely blind before taking a single flying lesson.  The strategy was to save on rental and be able to go up when we wanted and have a training plane at the end that would preserve it's resale value.  As we anticipated from the beginning we have outgrown the mission and capability of the CTLSi.  We only became pilots to fly cross-country, not do breakfast runs forever.

 

Our research and decision to go with a Lancair ES-P is complex, as anyone pondering a new high cost and high performance aircraft knows.  We are outfighting the plane with a parachute (few even understand the importance of that).  We did not go with retractable gear, multi-engine, or a plane with a poor safety history.  And along with the higher performance; wanted cabin pressurization and the ability to fly above the weather; both capabilities few other four-seaters have...

 

One could make the case that flying low and slow in a non-controlled busy airport environment is more dangerous than where we are going next.. I will make no comment on the pilot experience/age issue.  People vary in regard to capability and the genes that kill one person at 50 and let's others go till 100.

 

   There's a very interesting and thought provoking article in a recent Flying Magazine  about an owner that crashed his Pilatus single turbo-prop pressurized airplane. This guy had some experience, though not a lot, was a PPL with an instrument rating. He had been to the airplane's ground school and flew extra time with his instructor.

 

  FWIW

 

The National Transportation Safety Board's final report on the June 2012 inflight breakup of a Pilatus PC-12 over Central Florida highlights the risks of flying a high-performance airplane in IMC with minimum training and experience.

 

Weeks after the accident the NTSB issued a safety alert to pilots warning about the inherent latency of in-cockpit Nexrad weather images. The breakup happened in the vicinity of huge thunderstorms with "extreme" echoes, as reported by a controller to the accident pilot. Did the pilot inadvertently fly into one of these violent cells, leading to an inflight breakup that claimed the lives of all six on board?

 

No, not even close.

 

As is so often the case, the probable cause involved a chain of interconnected events. Here's what really happened, according to investigators:

 

The pilot was climbing to his assigned altitude of FL 260 on autopilot in IMC when he activated the propeller deice and inertial separator climbing through FL 250. Another pilot nearby reported light rime icing at FL 260. The pilot of the PC-12 did not activate the deice boots, suggesting the icing wasn't much of a concern.

 

About a minute later ATC cleared the PC-12 to deviate right of course to avoid the towering embedded thunderstorms, which were still well ahead of the airplane. About 4 seconds into the turn, at an indicated airspeed of 109 knots and less than 25 degrees of bank, the autopilot disconnected for unknown reasons. At this point the airplane began to roll right, descending and reaching a bank angle of about 50 degrees.

 

Rather than take immediate control of the airplane and roll wings level, the pilot at this point initiated a test of the autopilot system. It passed. By this point, however, the airplane had rolled into a 75 degree nose down bank with the airspeed climbing through 335 ktas — about 110 kias above maximum operating maneuvering speed.

 

At last grasping the idea that he needed to do something as the altitude tape spooled through 16,000 feet, the pilot hauled back on the yoke, in the process tearing off both wings. The right wing ripped through the fuselage, ejecting one passenger. The bodies of the other five onboard were recovered with the main wreckage in an open field.

 

The post-accident examination of the controls and engine found no anomalies. The flaps were in the retracted position but the gear was down (investigators hypothesize that the pilot put the gear down at some point during the descent). For reasons that could not be determined, the aileron trim was found in the nearly full-left-wing-down position and the rudder trim full nose right. An aerodynamics performance study indicated the wing did not stall, nor did the stick pusher activate prior to loss of control. Icing was determined not to have been a factor.

 

As far as the pilot's qualifications, they were questionable, although he met the minimum legal requirements. Prior to purchasing the Pilatus PC-12 about five weeks earlier, the pilot had never logged any PIC time in turboprops, nor had he logged any actual IMC time in the preceding seven years and four months. His last flight under the hood occurred four years and seven months before the accident flight. After buying the PC-12, the pilot attended simulator training, spending extra time to receive an instrument proficiency check, flight review and high-altitude endorsement.

 

A pilot who trained with the accident pilot in the simulator told investigators he seemed to be behind the airplane. After one takeoff he forgot to retract the landing gear and then flew through an altitude assignment of 1,500 feet. After training the pilot flew the airplane about 14 hours before the accident flight, bringing his total PIC flight experience to about 750 hours, most of it in piston singles.

 

In its final report, the NTSB said the pilot's lack of experience was evidenced by the fact that he began testing the autopilot rather than rolling wings level after the airplane departed controlled flight. As a result, investigators determined the probable cause of the accident to be: "The failure of the pilot to maintain control of the airplane while climbing to cruise altitude in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) following disconnect of the autopilot. The reason for the autopilot disconnect could not be determined during postaccident testing. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's lack of experience in high-performance, turbo-propeller airplanes and in IMC." 

[Top Cat]

Of course.

 

I think Lufthansa still does their training ab initio in Bonanzas. We met a fellow who had just soloed in one at one of our fuel stops on the way back from Page.

 

With the right instructor, the right program, the right student and, perhaps most importantly, the right attitude, it certainly can be done.

 

I look forward to progress reports on both the build and the training.

 

   Whilst at the airline I got a close look at the Lufthansa ab-initio program a few years back.

 

  They can take a brand new student, with zero time, and introduce them to the ab-initio course in AZ using the Lufthansa crew resource management procedural techniques.

  Pilots graduate from the Lufthansa Academy from Bonanza to the Baron and return to Germany with a CPL/IR frozen ATPL and ready for  assignment to a the fleet. The students I met went right into the FO seat of the 737 in the Bremen training facility and emerged as a qualified Second Officer with, amazingly 350 hours total time. Quality, high quality, time I should add. Many now go into RJs.

  They are then pairs on the line with a training Captain and alternate legs with the regular FO with the approval of the captain or occupy the jumpseat.

After a few months of this they're released to the line.

 

  They're hugely disciplined and regimented and have all the right attitudes and procedural training to fit in with any other crew at their airline. This is certainly what is going on in the USA albeit not with ab-initio students. BA and other European airlines are now taking cadets in ab-inition programs. Personally they were never taking students when I applied to BEA/BOAC years ago! So I had to do it the hard way…longer and much more expensive.

[gbigs]

Do more hours in the air make one complacent, careless, even risk-taking?  And by contrast will a low time pilot be sharper, work harder, assume the worst?  Pilot error is a function of decision making and the number of hours in the air are not the singular indicator of making solid decisions...

 

If flying safety were somehow elevated by experience alone then these crashes would not be happening.

 

Doomed TBM 900 Pilot And Wife Killed

 

Larry Glazer, the owner of the new TBM 900 and chairman of the TBM Owners and Pilots Association, was cruising at FL 280 with his wife, Jane, also a high-time pilot when something went wrong.  The plane was later found at the bottom of the sea south of Florida.  Both pilots had thousands of hours in TBMs.  Larry had 5,000 hours in TBMs specifically.

 

http://www.flyingmag.com/technique/accidents/doomed-tbm-900-pilot-twice-asked-lower-altitude#5z2CkvYuBu2J9flh.99

[IrishAl]

 

   There's a very interesting and thought provoking article in a recent Flying Magazine  about an owner that crashed his Pilatus single turbo-prop pressurized airplane. This guy had some experience, though not a lot, was a PPL with an instrument rating. He had been to the airplane's ground school and flew extra time with his instructor.

 

  FWIW

 

The National Transportation Safety Board's final report on the June 2012 inflight breakup of a Pilatus PC-12 over Central Florida highlights the risks of flying a high-performance airplane in IMC with minimum training and experience.

 

Weeks after the accident the NTSB issued a safety alert to pilots warning about the inherent latency of in-cockpit Nexrad weather images. The breakup happened in the vicinity of huge thunderstorms with "extreme" echoes, as reported by a controller to the accident pilot. Did the pilot inadvertently fly into one of these violent cells, leading to an inflight breakup that claimed the lives of all six on board?

 

No, not even close.

 

As is so often the case, the probable cause involved a chain of interconnected events. Here's what really happened, according to investigators:

 

The pilot was climbing to his assigned altitude of FL 260 on autopilot in IMC when he activated the propeller deice and inertial separator climbing through FL 250. Another pilot nearby reported light rime icing at FL 260. The pilot of the PC-12 did not activate the deice boots, suggesting the icing wasn't much of a concern.

 

About a minute later ATC cleared the PC-12 to deviate right of course to avoid the towering embedded thunderstorms, which were still well ahead of the airplane. About 4 seconds into the turn, at an indicated airspeed of 109 knots and less than 25 degrees of bank, the autopilot disconnected for unknown reasons. At this point the airplane began to roll right, descending and reaching a bank angle of about 50 degrees.

 

Rather than take immediate control of the airplane and roll wings level, the pilot at this point initiated a test of the autopilot system. It passed. By this point, however, the airplane had rolled into a 75 degree nose down bank with the airspeed climbing through 335 ktas — about 110 kias above maximum operating maneuvering speed.

 

At last grasping the idea that he needed to do something as the altitude tape spooled through 16,000 feet, the pilot hauled back on the yoke, in the process tearing off both wings. The right wing ripped through the fuselage, ejecting one passenger. The bodies of the other five onboard were recovered with the main wreckage in an open field.

 

The post-accident examination of the controls and engine found no anomalies. The flaps were in the retracted position but the gear was down (investigators hypothesize that the pilot put the gear down at some point during the descent). For reasons that could not be determined, the aileron trim was found in the nearly full-left-wing-down position and the rudder trim full nose right. An aerodynamics performance study indicated the wing did not stall, nor did the stick pusher activate prior to loss of control. Icing was determined not to have been a factor.

 

As far as the pilot's qualifications, they were questionable, although he met the minimum legal requirements. Prior to purchasing the Pilatus PC-12 about five weeks earlier, the pilot had never logged any PIC time in turboprops, nor had he logged any actual IMC time in the preceding seven years and four months. His last flight under the hood occurred four years and seven months before the accident flight. After buying the PC-12, the pilot attended simulator training, spending extra time to receive an instrument proficiency check, flight review and high-altitude endorsement.

 

A pilot who trained with the accident pilot in the simulator told investigators he seemed to be behind the airplane. After one takeoff he forgot to retract the landing gear and then flew through an altitude assignment of 1,500 feet. After training the pilot flew the airplane about 14 hours before the accident flight, bringing his total PIC flight experience to about 750 hours, most of it in piston singles.

 

In its final report, the NTSB said the pilot's lack of experience was evidenced by the fact that he began testing the autopilot rather than rolling wings level after the airplane departed controlled flight. As a result, investigators determined the probable cause of the accident to be: "The failure of the pilot to maintain control of the airplane while climbing to cruise altitude in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) following disconnect of the autopilot. The reason for the autopilot disconnect could not be determined during postaccident testing. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's lack of experience in high-performance, turbo-propeller airplanes and in IMC." 

 

That's an astonishing response - he literally overlooked his option to fly the plane and tried instead to fix up his computer so it could go back to flying it for him.

Looks like a gross over-dependency on technology - "hit the button and let the plane do it for me".   Technology is great but it can produce an illusion of capability, it seems.

New pilots might learn to actually fly the plane a lot better if they were allowed only the minimum of instrumentation in the cockpit.

[WmInce]

"The best safety device in any aircraft is . . . a well trained pilot."

[IrishAl]

Trouble is, that phrase means different things to different ears.  

Well trained in managing systems is very different from being well trained in flying by the seat of the pants, and that made the difference in the aforementioned example.

[Top Cat]

"The best safety device in any aircraft is . . . a well trained pilot."

A superior pilot uses his superior judgment to avoid situations that would require the use of his superior skills.

[skyranger757]

I hope this is just a lot of attention craving talk and not a serious plan.

[Top Cat]

"Do more hours in the air make one complacent, careless, even risk-taking?  And by contrast will a low time pilot be sharper, work harder, assume the worst?  Pilot error is a function of decision making and the number of hours in the air are not the singular indicator of making solid decisions…"

 

 In the example I mentioned, about Lufthansa students going from zero time to right seat FO in 350 hours,  the point is that the 350 hours were intensive, procedural based, crew concept, very high quality hours. Another pilot with 350 hours in only a C150 for example is not as qualified or as capable.

 

  Pilot error often begins on the ground. Choosing to make a flight above their skill and experience level, and once airborne compounding that poor judgement. Choosing an airplane beyond their existing skill set or experience level. In the Pilatus accident example despite being trained in the airplane, having gone to the ground school, being signed off for a BFR and an instrument proficiency check, the pilot lost the airplane because he simply stopped flying it.

 

"Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect."

[skyranger757]

I think many people are telling you this is a serious mistake.

[gbigs]

"Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect."

 

 

Arguably pilots choosing to fly in unsafe weather is the biggest error in pilot judgement leading to an emergency or worse.

 

But this debate is as endless as are the ones over how to land, how to fuel, how to avoid a spin, how to communicate in the air, and whether steam gauges are better or worse than glass panels.

 

There is no magic number of hours flown for a given aircraft in class other than those defined by the FAA when achieving a new class and/or rating.  The prudent pilot will not go up in an ANY new aircraft without SOME dual time and transition training.  In this case, such training is part of the plan.

[Duane Jefts]

In general terms, the more experienced pilot is going to be a safer pilot. 

 

There are exceptions to every rule but having taught in King Air simulators, C-130 simulators, Falcon Jet simulators and B-727 simulators as well as the aircraft, I can absolutely assert the more experienced pilot is the safer pilot.  Flying skills are not the same as safety skills. 

 

There are exceptions but as my Folks used to say,  "I'd like to see a little grey in my pilots hair".

[FastEddieB]

I hope this is just a lot of attention craving talk and not a serious plan.

Welcome to the forum.

 

Your opinions would probably carry a bit more weight if we knew something about you!

 

Just sayin'!

[2FlyAgain]

 

Gee, these new emoticons are useful...

[FastEddieB]

Do more hours in the air make one complacent, careless, even risk-taking? And by contrast will a low time pilot be sharper, work harder, assume the worst? Pilot error is a function of decision making and the number of hours in the air are not the singular indicator of making solid decisions...

 

If flying safety were somehow elevated by experience alone then these crashes would not be happening.

 

Doomed TBM 900 Pilot And Wife Killed

 

...Both pilots had thousands of hours in TBMs. Larry had 5,000 hours in TBMs specifically.

 

 

No reasonable person would assert that time and experience make one immune from accidents.

 

When discussing this, the Holy (Unholy?) Trinity in my mind is...

 

Crossfield, Fossett and Imeson.

 

Each of those (worth Googling if unfamiliar - Scott, Steve and Sparky), had experience and hours far eclipsing most if not all on this forum. Yet something still got each of them in the end.

 

But...

 

...none of this logically leads one to a disconnect between total hours, and specifically time-in-type, and accident rate. There's a reason the FAA sets minimum hours for various ratings and certificates and privileges. And the insurance industry certainly has data correlating hours with accident rates, which are reflected in premiums.

[FastEddieB]

Deleted ref: not funny.

 

Prior post truncated with an off topic afterthought removed.

[Admin2]

Leave the personal attacks alone.

 

I guess temporary suspensions aren't working and some don't seem to learn from the suspended ones. 

 They have nothing to do with flying.

We accidentally 2-3 people maybe we won't have a need for admin interaction anymore and personal attacks will disappear!

 

I guess we need to up the ante with permanent solutions!

 

Volunteers?

[FastEddieB]

Sorry.

 

Mine was intended to be a joke.

 

Feel free to delete it if it's not funny. Or I will. (I just did)

 

FWIW, I have tried to keep my posts balanced and on point throughout this thread. It's pretty easy to see where it started to go off the rails.

[WmInce]

. . . When you post a question, you should consider all the responses, not just the ones you like.

 

Has this forum morphed to a point, where challenging someone's post or calling them out on a questionable issue is considered a personal attack?

[Top Cat]

"As we anticipated from the beginning we have outgrown the mission and capability of the CTLSi.  We only became pilots to fly cross-country, not do breakfast runs forever."

 

  This is an interesting comment, especially since on many previous occasions you have derided other LSAs (other than FD, and your CTLSi in particular) because THEY were deemed inferior and incapable of "true cross-country flying" unlike the CTLSi.

  Other CTLSi owners have reported being able to fly extensive cross-country trips and have done it with economical fuel burns, ability to carry baggage and found it to be comfortable and fun. This isn't limited to just the CTLSi either as many similar LSAs are equally capable of more than 'breakfast runs'. So obviously the CTLSi is quite capable in this regard, a point which you have posted on numerous times.

 

  Begs the question, have you simply become bored with the CTLSi and FD, and perhaps with Sport flying in general?

 

 If the Lancair is now your airplane of choice there are a few available for sale already complete so why go the construction route? A good used model could still be outfitted to your liking, not sure about the chute as a retro-fit.

 

  What is your planned program to transition to this airplane? How long do you anticipate it will take and what do the insurance companies require of a lower time PPL pilot aged 65-67 in order to secure coverage?

 

  Is there a Lancair owners/pilots forum where you can learn about the building process, ownership and flying?

[WmInce]

You missed the point.  It's not a criticism of having more than one nic.  It's sneaking back on the board after being banned by changing nics....he is a friend of your, right?

 

Well . . . not exactly.

I only met him once.

We got into a big fist fight.

He ended up giving me a black eye and I bit off the tip of his left (pointed) ear.

[Roger Lee]

"Has this forum morphed to a point, where challenging someone's post or calling them out on a questionable issue is considered a personal attack?"

 

No, but some do cross the line and the post then has nothing to do with the subject and is aimed right at the poster and not in a funny way as two friends would tease.

I would read each post more than once and look at it from more than one angle and see if it can be taken any other way than what you intended or if it has nothing to do with the topic and talks about an individual it may be taken wrong. Sometimes the delete button is a better choice before the post button. I have done that many times. Type a huge paragraph and then walk off, reconsider then come back and hit delete. My post wouldn't have added anything worth while to the real topic. 

 

Remember the old saying: Discretion is the better part of valor. Don't need to win them all and some don't need a winner.